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Tackling Undeclared Work in the European Union: Beyond the Rational 





To tackle the undeclared economy, an emergent literature has called for the dominant 
“rational economic actor” approach, which increases the sanctions and risk of 
detection, to be replaced and/or complemented by a “social actor” approach that 
fosters citizens’ commitment to compliance. Reporting two waves of the 
Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2007 and 2013 across Europe, fixed-effects 
logistic regression analysis reveals that although both approaches reduce participation 
in undeclared work, the strength of the impact of deterrents on the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work has weakened between 2007 and 2013, but has 
strengthened for vertical and horizontal trust. The paper concludes by discussing the 
policy implications of these findings. 
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Across the member states of the European Union and beyond, paid transactions occur that are 
not declared to the state for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when they should 
be declared. Schneider estimates this undeclared economy to be equivalent to 17.9 per cent of 
the EU-28 GDP in 2016 (Schneider 2016). Tackling the undeclared economy has thus become 
a core issue on the policy agendas of supra-national agencies and governments (European 
Commission 2016; ILO 2015; OECD 2012). How, therefore, can the undeclared economy be 
tackled? Reviewing the literature, two main distinct approaches can be identified, namely a 
“rational economic actor” approach that tackles undeclared work by ensuring that the payoff 
from undeclared work is outweighed by the costs, and a “social actor” approach grounded in a 
view that undeclared work arises when tax morale is low. However, Alm and Torgler (2011) 
identify three different administrative paradigms which can be used for encouraging tax 
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compliance, which require different policy measures. The first one, the “enforcement 
paradigm”, views tax payers as potential criminals and uses deterrents (i.e., audits and 
penalties) to repress non-compliant behaviour similar to the “rational economic actor” view.  
In the second paradigm, the “service paradigm”, although the role of deterrent measures is 
recognised, the emphasis is on administrative reforms to ensure a more “customer-friendly” 
tax administration, to simplify the process and to provide tax education and assistance to 
taxpayers.  The third “trust paradigm” acknowledges the role of tax morale and social norms 
in tax compliance decisions, akin to the “social actor” approach (Alm and Torgler 2011).  The 
evidence that increasing deterrents elicits reductions in undeclared work is less than 
conclusive with some studies revealing it is reduced and others not (Williams 2014a). Despite 
the wider academic literature questioning the effectiveness of deterrents, a survey in 2010 of 
policy stakeholders in 31 European countries shows that the perceived penalties and/or 
perceived sanctions are considered effective means of tackling undeclared work (i.e. 50% of 
stakeholders view the perceived penalties as effective and 64% share the same opinion about 
the improving the risk of detection) (Williams et al. 2013). A similar survey conducted in 
2017 across 23 Member States of the European Union, reveals that the dominant view of the 
enforcement bodies has not changed; deterrence measures are viewed as the most important 
type of measure and the most effective measure for tackling undeclared work. However, the 
same survey also reveals little ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of policy measures used 
(Williams and Puts 2017). This paper starts to fill that gap. The aim is to evaluate whether 
there have been changes over time in the effectiveness of the main “rational economic actor” 
deterrence approach used across the Member States of the European Union, along with the 
emergent “social actor” approach.  
To do this, the first section will briefly set the context by reviewing the policy 
approaches available for tackling undeclared work, outlining the main “rational economic 
actor” approach used by the enforcement bodies and the emergent “social actor” approach. 
Revealing the lack of evidence that a deterrence approach is more effective at reducing the 
likelihood of participating in undeclared work than a “social actor” approach, and that the 
enforcement bodies continue to pursue a deterrence approach, the second section then reports 
the methodology and the data sets employed to evaluate the effectiveness of these policy 
approaches, whilst the third section will report the findings. This will display that, while the 
impact of deterrents on reducing undeclared work has weakened in 2013 compared with 2007, 
the impact of vertical and horizontal trust, which is at the core of the “social actor” approach, 
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has strengthened over the same period. The fourth and final section then discusses the 
resultant implications for policy and further research. 
Before commencing however, it is necessary to define undeclared work. In this paper, 
reflecting the widespread consensus in both the academic literature and policy circles, 
undeclared work is defined as paid work that is legal in all respects other than it is not 
declared to the authorities for tax, social security or labour law purposes (Aliyev 2015; Boels 
2014; European Commission 2007; OECD 2012; Williams 2014a, 2014b). If there are 
additional differences, then it is not undeclared work. For example, if the goods and/or 
services exchanged are illegal (such as illegal drugs), then this is not undeclared work but part 
of the wider criminal economy. 
Policy Approaches Towards Undeclared Work: Beyond the “Economic Rational Actor” 
Conventionally, governments have adopted a rational economic actor approach when tackling 
undeclared work. In 1972, Allingham and Sandmo viewed participation in undeclared work as 
arising when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972). This was subsequently widely adopted (Grabiner 2000; Job, 
Stout, and Smith 2007; Richardson and Sawyer 2001), resulting in governments seeking to 
deter participation by increasing the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection. Until 
now, as Table 1 displays, the evidence that increasing deterrents elicits reductions in 
undeclared work is less than conclusive with some studies revealing that this reduces it and 
others not (Williams 2014a). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Some earlier literature, based on surveys and experiments, supportive of the rational actor 
approach, found that increasing the probability of detection and/or the sanctions level reduces 
participation in the undeclared economy (Dubin and Wilde 1988; Feld and Frey 2002; 
Friedland 1982; Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg 1978; Klepper and Nagin 1989; Mazzolini, 
Pagani, and Santoro 2017; Schwartz and Orleans 1967; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 
2001; Webley and Halstead 1986; Witte and Woodbury 1985). Indeed, a meta-analysis of 
twenty laboratory experiments conducted mainly with students in the United States, Central 
America, Europe and Israel, concluded that increasing the penalty and the probability of 
audits increase the tax compliance (Blackwell 2010).  Similarly, studies conducted at the 
macro level, analyzing secondary data at country or regional level, provide support to the 
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rational actor approach (Kluge and Libman 2017; Mas’ud, Manaf, and Saad 2015). However, 
the risk of detection seems to be more efficient than the severity of the sanction (Friedland 
1982; Webley and Halstead 1986; Williams and Horodnic 2017a, 2017b). The results of a 
meta-analysis of the experimental results in the United States showed that in nearly all 
laboratory experiments, a higher audit rate led to an increase in compliance, but increasing 
penalties had only a marginal effect (Alm 1999).  Other literature is only partially supportive 
of the “rational actor approach, calling for complementary policy approaches in order to 
obtain greater tax compliance (Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan 1995; Bernasconi 1998; Grasmick 
and Bursik 1990; Schwartz and Orleans 1967; Wenzel 2004; Williams and Horodnic 2017a, 
2017b). However, yet other literature argues that increasing the level of deterrents has no 
effect (Hartl et al. 2015; Shaw, Slemrod, and Whiting 2008; Williams and Franic 2015, 2016) 
or even leads to increased noncompliance (Chang and Lai 2004; Hofmann et al. 2017; 
Kaplanoglou and Rapanos 2015; Kaplanoglou, Rapanos, and Daskalakis 2016; Mohdali, Isa, 
and Yusoff 2014; Murphy 2005, 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007) which might be a result of 
the breakdown of trust between the state and its citizens. Furthermore, no significant 
association was found between deterrent measures and an individuals` tax morale (Torgler 
2005a). However, previous studies show that in low trust environments with perceived low 
power of the authorities, there is a high intention of evading taxes (Kaplanoglou and Rapanos 
2015; Kogler et al. 2013). Furthermore, a high expected penalty for tax evasion even causes 
citizens to choose a low income redistribution policy (Solano-Garcia 2017). Meanwhile, a 
high interactional fairness and a low level of deterrents results in a high intention of 
compliance (Farrar, Kaplan, and Thorne 2017; Murphy 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007). 
These results support the view that there are different types of individuals who decide whether 
to comply taking into account different rationales.  Drawing inspiration from Vogel (1974) 
work, Torgler (2003a) developed a typology comprising four types of taxpayers. According to 
this typology, only for the “tax evaders” which have a low tax morale and search ways to 
evade taxes by weighing the costs and benefits of being non-compliant, the most appropriate 
policy approaches are those related with the “rational economic actor” approach. The other 
three typologies, emphasize other reasons for compliance, namely “social taxpayers” are 
influenced by the social norms and the behavior of those close to them, “intrinsic taxpayers” 
are influenced by the behavior of the government and how the tax administration treat them 
and, “honest taxpayers”, the opposite extreme to the “tax evaders”, do not search ways to 
evade taxes regardless of the level of deterrence (Torgler 2003a).  
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However, the most important rebuttal of the use of deterrents is the evidence that 
many citizens voluntarily comply even when the level of penalties and risk of detection would 
suggest that they should not if they were truly rational economic actors (Murphy 2008). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
The rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): The higher the perceived deterrents, the 
lower the likelihood of participation in undeclared work. 
H1a: The higher the perceived sanctions, the lower the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work. 
H1b: The higher the perceived risk of detection, the lower the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work. 
 
In recent years, drawing inspiration from a variant of institutional theory (Helmke and 
Levistky 2004; North 1990), a new social actor approach has emerged which focuses upon 
developing the social contract between the state and its citizens to engender a voluntary 
willingness to comply, rather than forcing citizens to comply using threats, and/or harassment. 
Thus, a new way of explaining and tackling undeclared work has been advanced (Williams 
and Horodnic 2015; Williams, Horodnic, and Windebank 2015). This attributes undeclared 
work to result from formal institutional imperfections that produce an asymmetry between the 
codified laws and regulations of a society’s formal institutions (“state morale”) and the 
socially shared unwritten rules of its informal institutions (“civic morale”). The greater the 
resultant institutional asymmetry due to these formal institutional failings, the higher is the 
likelihood of undeclared work. Participation in undeclared work thus emerges when “tax 
morale” (i.e. the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes) is low. The goal, therefore, is to engender a 
commitment of the population to self-regulate by improving their tax morale (Kirchler 2007; 
Torgler 2007, 2011).  Indeed, studies using survey data, conducted in different countries in 
Europe (Williams and Franic 2015, 2016; Williams, Horodnic, and Burkinshaw 2016; 
Windebank and Horodnic 2017), regions of the European Union (Williams and Horodnic 
2015, 2017b) or the whole European Union (Williams and Horodnic 2017a; Williams, 
Horodnic, and Windebank 2015), confirm that the higher the tax morale, the lower the 
individuals` likelihood to participate in undeclared work. The effect of tax morale on the 
wider shadow economy has been also confirmed when analysing data measured at country 
level rather than individual level (Torgler and Schneider 2007, 2009).  
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However, the scholarship based on institutional asymmetry theory has until now 
focused almost entirely upon the relationship between participation in undeclared work and 
the level of “vertical trust” (between government and citizens). An important facet of the 
social actor approach that has been less investigated is the relationship between participation 
in undeclared work and the level of “horizontal trust” (between citizens). While previous 
studies failed to identify a relationship between generalised trust (i.e. a trust in other people) 
and non-compliant behaviours (for an extensive review see Chan, Supriyadi, and Torgler 
2018), horizontal trust in the form of trusting other individuals to be tax compliant is linked to 
participation in undeclared work.  It can be argued, for example, that individuals are more 
likely to evade tax if they live in a community where tax evasion is considered widespread, 
not least because they might then be less worried about the formal and informal sanctions, but 
also because they might consider that everybody else does it so why should they be 
compliant. Indeed, although not using the institutional asymmetry framework, previous 
studies, using laboratory experiments, reveal that taxpayers’ inclination to comply depends on 
the behaviour of their fellow citizens (Alm 2017; Ajzen 1991; Chang and Lai 2004; Traxler 
2010) and that individuals comply if tax compliance is the social norm (Alm 1999, 2012; 
Alm, McClellan, and Schulze 1999). Moreover, a link between tax compliance and the 
psychic stress of breaking a social norm has been identified (Dulleck et al. 2016). For 
example, a laboratory experiment conducted in three European countries (Belgium, France, 
and the Netherlands) reveals that for participants who received information about low 
compliance identified in previous studies, tax evasion increased significantly, but those who 
received information about high compliance did not increase their subsequent tax evasion 
(Lefebvre et al. 2015). Furthermore, although there is little evidence based on surveys, two 
experiments conducted in the UK (Hallsworth et al. 2017) and in Austria (Fellner et al. 2013) 
confirm that tax compliance is influenced by information on the level of compliance of other 
citizens. In both field experiments, the level of tax compliance was increased after the 
experimental groups received a letter informing them about the high compliance of their 
peers. Thus, the individuals’ behaviour is conditionally cooperative, they are willing to be 
compliant conditioned by the behaviour of others (Traxler 2010). Similar results were 
obtained when investigating the effect of vertical trust and horizontal trust on tax morale 
namely, a strong effect of vertical trust or the perceived tax evasion of other individuals and a 
lack or inconsistent relationship with generalised trust (Chan, Supriyadi, and Torgler 2018; 





The social actor hypothesis (H2): The lower the horizontal trust and vertical trust, the 
higher is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work. 
H2a: The lower the vertical trust, the higher the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work. 
H2b: The lower the horizontal trust, the higher the likelihood of participation 
in undeclared work. 
 
Analysing the policy approaches employed by the governments across the European Union, it 
becomes quickly apparent not only that the deterrents represent the most common policy 
approach but also that the importance attributed to this approach has increased over time. 
Indeed, a survey conducted in 2010 amongst stakeholders in 31 European countries shows 
that both increasing the perceived penalties and risk of detection are considered effective 
means of tackling undeclared work. While 100 per cent of governments use policy measures 
that seek to improve the risk of detection and 93 per cent use penalty measures, only 90 per 
cent use preventive measures, 69 per cent measures aimed to foster commitment to declared 
work and 64 per cent curative measures. The views of the stakeholders regarding the 
effectiveness of these policy measures place the measures for improving the risk of detection 
in first place, followed by curative measures, penalties, preventive measures and lastly, 
measures aimed to foster commitment to declared work (Williams et al. 2013).  
A similar study conducted in 2017 in 23 Member State of the European Union, reveals 
that the perceived effectiveness of deterrence measures is higher in 2017 compared with 2010. 
As such, the rank order from the perceived most effective to the least effective measure for 
tackling undeclared work reveals that senior government officials perceive penalties as the 
most effective policy measure, followed by measures to improve detection, awareness raising 
campaigns (i.e., fostering commitment to declared work), incentives to operate in the declared 
economy (i.e., curative measures) and least effective are the measures related to changing the 
formal institutions (i.e., preventive measures) (Williams and Puts 2017). Therefore, in 2017, 
the measures related to the “rational economic actor” deterrence approach are perceived as the 
top two most effective policy measures for tackling undeclared work, while measures related 
to curative measures, preventive measures and measures aimed to foster commitment to 
declared work (i.e., the “social actor” approach) are considered less effective than in 2010. 
Thus, despite the widespread recognition that deterrents need to be complemented by 
measures that foster trust between citizens and between government and citizens in order to 
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increase the voluntary compliance, many member states of the European Union remain 
entrenched in a deterrence approach towards undeclared work. According to the European 
Platform for Tackling Undeclared Work members and observers, and confirmed by a 2017 
survey on them, the dominance of deterrence measures is for two main reasons, namely the 
lack of a short-term quantifiable outcome from non-deterrents and few evaluations existing of 
the effect of non-deterrence measures, which hinder their adoption (Williams and Puts 2017).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
As Table 2 displays, in many countries the share of the shadow economy increased and in 
those countries where it decreased, this reduction is rather marginal. Similarly, the results of 
the two waves of the Eurobarometer on undeclared work show that the reported participation 
in undeclared work in the European Union decreased by 1 per cent in 2013 compared with 
2007. Thus, the phenomenon seems to be persistent. If these senior stakeholders are correct in 
their views, then the effectiveness of deterrents in reducing the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work should have increased over time, and the effectiveness of improving vertical 
and horizontal trust in reducing the likelihood of participation should have decreased over 
time. As such, the following hypotheses can be tested: 
 
The increasing effectiveness of deterrents hypothesis (H3): the relationship between 
deterrents and the likelihood of participation in undeclared work is stronger in 2013 
compared with 2007. 
H3a: The relationship between the perceived sanctions and the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work is stronger in 2013 compared with 2007. 
H3b: The relationship between the perceived risk of detection and the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work is stronger in 2013 compared 
with 2007. 
 
The decreasing effectiveness of vertical and horizontal trust hypothesis (H4):  the 
relationship between vertical and horizontal trust and the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work is weaker in 2013 compared with 2007. 
H4a: The relationship between vertical trust and the likelihood of participation 
in undeclared work is weaker in 2013 compared with 2007. 
9 
 
H4b: The relationship between horizontal trust and the likelihood of 




Data and analytical approach 
To analyse the relationship between the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work and the 
“rational economic actor” approach (which uses deterrents to ensure that the costs of 
undeclared work outweigh the benefits) on the one hand, and the complementary “social 
actor” approach (which focuses upon improving both vertical trust and horizontal trust) on the 
other hand, a pooled data set is reported. The dataset is built by combining two special 
Eurobarometer surveys on undeclared work conducted in 2007 and 2013. In 2007, the Special 
Eurobarometer No.284 involved 26,659 face-to-face interviews over the 27 member states of 
the European Union (EU-27). In 2013, this survey was repeated, with Special Eurobarometer 
survey No. 402 involving 27,563 face-to-face interviews across the 28 member states of the 
European Union. We here exclude Croatia from the analysis and analyse the 26,563 
interviews conducted in the EU-27 level to enable comparison with the 2007 wave. 
Both waves used a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology which 
ensured that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, each country as well as 
each level of sample was representative in proportion to its population size. Here therefore, 
for univariate analysis we employ the sample weighting scheme as recommended in both the 
wider literature (Sharon and Liu 1994; Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2013; Winship and 
Radbill 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful descriptive results. 
For the multivariate analysis however, debate exists over whether to use a weighting scheme 
(Pfeffermann 1993; Sharon and Liu 1994; Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2013; Winship and 
Radbill 1994). Reflecting the majoritarian view, the decision has been taken here not to do so. 
For both the descriptive statistics and the multivariate analysis, we analysed all cases 
available for each analysed variable (don’t know and refusal were excluded). However, as a 
robustness check, and to avoid exclusion of some individuals because they did not provide 
answers to each and every question related to their participation in undeclared work, the main 
variables of interest (related with the economic and social actor hypotheses) and/or the socio-
demographic characteristics, we used multiple imputations (Bartlett and Carpenter 2013; 
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Rubin 1987). Twenty imputations were simulated through a system of chained equations for 
every missing value (details about the number of missing values are provided in Table A8). 
We provide in the Appendix the results of the robustness check, namely additive models in 
Table A1, models using recoded data for the main variables in Table A2, results using 
imputed data in Table A3 and results using two alternative types of estimation with both 
crude and imputed data in Tables A4 to A7.  
Variables  
To evaluate the association between the likelihood of participation in undeclared work in the 
EU-27 and the policy approaches, the dependent variable used is a dummy variable with 
recorded value 1 for persons carrying out undeclared work in the last 12 months prior to 
survey. For the policy approaches, four explanatory variables are used. Firstly, to evaluate the 
“rational economic actor” approach, two deterrents are investigated, namely the perceived risk 
of detection and the expected sanctions. The perceived risk of detection when engaging in 
undeclared work is measured as a dummy variable, with value 0 for a very small or fairly 
small perceived risk of detection and value 1 for a fairly high or very high risk. To evaluate 
how the expected sanctions if caught doing undeclared work are associated with the 
likelihood to participate in undeclared work, a dummy variable was used, with value 0 for 
those asserting that the normal tax or social security contributions would be due and value 1 
for those stating that the normal tax or social security contributions due, plus there would be a 
fine or imprisonment.  
Secondly, to evaluate the association between participation in undeclared work and the 
“social actor” approach, two variables measuring both vertical and horizontal trust are 
investigated. View through an institutionalist lens (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; North 1990), 
participation in undeclared work emerges when tax morale is low due to an institutional 
asymmetry caused by formal institutional failings. As such, a lack of trust in formal 
institutions is reflected in low tax morale. For measuring the vertical trust between citizens 
and government institutions, we thus use the tax morale of citizens as a proxy. Indeed, an 
extensive literature review on the factors that affect tax morale (Horodnic 2018) shows that 
the most salient factor that shapes tax morale is the trust in formal institutions, such as 
government, parliament, trust in the courts and legal system, trust in the tax authority and tax 
officials or other formal institutions (Alm and Torgler 2006; Andriani 2016; Chan, Supriyadi, 
and Torgler 2018; Filippin, Fiorio, and Viviano 2013; Frey and Torgler 2007; Ibrahim, 
Musah, and Abdul-Hanan 2015; Kondelaji et al. 2016; Leonardo 2011; Li 2010; Martinez-
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Vazquez and Torgler 2009; Ristovska, Mojsoska-Blazevski, and Nikolov 2013; Torgler 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2012; Torgler and Murphy 2004; Torgler, 
Schneider, and Schaltegger 2010; Torgler et al. 2008; Vythelingum et al. 2017). As such, 
although the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes is also shaped by other elements beyond vertical 
trust, tax morale represents a potent proxy for measuring vertical trust, between citizens and 
government.  The tax morale is a continuous variable representing an index of self-reported 
attitudes towards the acceptability of six noncompliant behaviours based on a 10-point Likert 
scale (“1” means absolutely unacceptable and “10” means absolutely acceptable). The index 
is represented here as a mean. The lower the index value, the higher is the tax morale. The 
questions used are: (1) someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; (2) an 
individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received to 
the tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared; (3) A firm is hired by a 
household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security 
authorities; (4) a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to 
the tax or social security authorities; (5) a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the 
wages paid to him\her are not officially declared and (6) someone evades taxes by not 
declaring or only partially declaring their income.  
The horizontal trust among citizens is measured using a dummy variable which 
displays if the respondent personally knows other persons engaged in undeclared work, coded 
with 1 if respondents know such persons and 0 if they do not know other persons engaged in 
undeclared work. This proxy for measuring the horizontal trust has been used in previous 
studies of participation in undeclared work (Stefanov, Williams, and Rodgers 2017; Williams 
and Horodnic 2017c; Williams, Radvansky, and Stefanik 2017). 
The socio-demographic and socio-economic control variables used in the study are 
selected based on previous studies which have determined the characteristics significantly 
associated with engagement in undeclared work (Williams and Franic 2015, 2016; Williams 
and Horodnic 2017a, 2017b) and are as follows:   
 Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for males and 0 for females. 
 Age: an interval variable indicating the exact age of a respondent and age squared (the 
squared value). 
 Occupation: a categorical variable for the occupational status of the respondent with 
value 1 for not working, value 2 for self-employed, value 3 for employed. 
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 Household size: a categorical variable measuring the number of people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 
2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons or more.  
 Community type: a categorical variable for the community type where the respondent 
lives with value 1 for rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and 
value 3 for large towns. 
Below we report the findings. 
Findings  
Comparing the descriptive findings, Figures 1 and 2 display a slight decrease in 2013 
compared with 2007 in the proportion of participants reporting engagement in undeclared 
work during the 12 months prior to the survey. In 2013, 4 per cent of respondents reported 
engagement in undeclared work compared with 5 per cent in 2007. Considering that 
participation in undeclared work is a sensitive issue, these figures represents a lower-bound 
estimate of the level of participation. Even so, 1 in 25 citizens of EU-27 reported engaging in 
undeclared work in the year prior to survey.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between the different policy approaches and the likelihood 
to participate in undeclared work, Figures 1 and 2 reveal the differences between those 
respondents engaged in undeclared work and those who did not, regarding their perceptions of 
the risk of detection and the expected sanctions (“rational economic actor” approach), and 
their tax morale and awareness about other persons engaged in undeclared work (“social 
actor” approach).     
Starting with the “rational economic actor” approach, Figure 1 displays that those 
engaged in undeclared work perceive the expected sanctions and risk of detection as lower 
than those not doing undeclared work. In 2007, 28 per cent of those doing undeclared work 
consider that only the normal tax or social security contributions will be due if caught 
compared with just 21 per cent of those not engaged in undeclared work. However, as Figure 
2 reveals, in 2013, this increased with 31 per cent of those doing undeclared work considering 
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that only the normal tax or social security contributions will be due if caught compared with 
just 25 per cent of those not engaged in undeclared work. Same trend is revealed when 
analysing the risk of detection. In 2007, 78 per cent of those doing undeclared work perceive 
the risk of being detected as very small or fairly small, compared with 63 per cent of those not 
engaged in undeclared work. In 2013, the share of respondents considering that the risk of 
detection is small or very small is lower, but a gap between those engaged in undeclared work 
and those not engaged is maintained. 71 per cent of those engaged in undeclared activities 
find the risk of detection small or very small as compared with 59 per cent of those not 
engaged in such activities. Both the level of perceived penalties and risk of detection, 
therefore, appear from these descriptive statistics to influence the likelihood of participation in 
both 2007 and 2013; the lower is the perceived penalties and risk of detection, the greater is 
the likelihood of participation in undeclared work.  
Turning to the “social actor” approach, the results reveal that those engaging in 
undeclared work have a lower level of tax morale (3.58 in 2007 and 3.55 in 2013) compared 
with those not engaging in undeclared work (2.36 in 2007 and 2.23 in 2013). Furthermore, a 
larger share of those engaged in undeclared work personally know other people engaged in 
undeclared work (87 per cent in 2007 and 84 per cent in 2013) compared with those not 
engaged in undeclared work (38 per cent in 2007 and 31 per cent in 2013). Both the level of 
vertical trust and horizontal trust, therefore, seem from these descriptive statistics to influence 
the likelihood of participation in both 2007 and 2013; the lower is the level of both vertical 
and horizontal trust, the greater is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work.  
To analyse whether these differences remain significant when a range of control 
variables are taken into account and held constant, Table 3 reports the results of a fixed-
effects logistic regression analysis. Model 1 analyses both waves and includes as an additional 
control variable the year dummy, Model 2 includes the same variables except the year 
dummy, while Model 3 and Model 4 analyse separately the two waves (2007 and 2013) in 
order to ensure a comparative perspective. 
Starting with the relationship between the likelihood of engagement in undeclared 
work and the perceived level of deterrents (i.e., “rational economic actor” approach), when 
other variables are introduced and held constant, a statistically significant association is 
identified. Those perceiving the expected sanctions as high (i.e. tax or social security 
contributions plus a fine or prison) are less likely to engage in undeclared work compared 
with those perceiving the sanctions as low (only the tax and security contributions due) 
(confirming H1a). Examining the relationship between the likelihood of engagement in 
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undeclared work and the perceived level of risk of being detected, a similar trend is identified. 
Those viewing the risk of being caught as fairly high or very high are less likely to engage in 
undeclared work compared with those who consider the risk of being caught as fairly small 
and very small (confirming H1b). These results, therefore, support the deterrence approach 
adopted by many governments; increasing the actual or perceived penalties and risks of 
detection is associated with reductions in the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work.  
As a robustness check of these results, various specifications of the models are 
reported in the Appendix. Table A1 shows that the association between the variables related 
with the two policy approaches and the likelihood of participation in undeclared work does 
not change when an additive fashion approach is employed, and the additional control 
variables are added in turn. Table A2 reports the estimates using different coding for the 
perceived risk of detection and tax morale while Table A3 provides the results obtained by 
analysing the imputed data. Despite the difference in the sample size (53,222 respondents 
compared with 38,413 individuals for both waves; 26,659 compared with 19,245 for the 2007 
wave and 26,563 compared with 19,168 for the 2013 wave), the results remain the same. The 
only notable difference is the significance of the association between the expected sanctions 
and the likelihood of participating in undeclared work for the 2013 wave, which can be 
explained by the high number of the imputations for the “expected sanction” variable (see 
Table A8 in the Appendix).  However, the direction of the association remains the same. Also, 
the results remain similar when two different types of regression are employed, namely 
multilevel logistic regression and logistic regression with country dummies, for both crude 
and imputed data, showing the robustness of the findings (Tables A4-A7). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
  
Turning to the “social actor” approach, the finding again is that engagement in undeclared 
work is significantly associated with both the level of vertical trust (i.e., level of tax morale) 
and horizontal trust (i.e., knowing personally other persons engaged in undeclared work). The 
higher the tax morality, the lower is the likelihood of participation in undeclared work 
(confirming H2a). Additionally, those knowing other persons engaging in undeclared work 
are more likely to do the same compared with those who do not have acquaintances working 
undeclared (confirming H2b).  
Analysing the registered changes over time in the effectiveness of these two distinct 
policy approaches, as Models 3 and 4 display, the rank based on their effectiveness is 
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different in 2013 compared with 2007, but not in the direction suggested by the policy 
makers. In 2007, the highest marginal effect is reported for knowing other persons working 
undeclared, followed by the perceived risk of detection, tax morale and the lowest marginal 
effect is reported for the perceived severity of the sanction. Indeed, looking at the two most 
effective measures, knowing other persons working undeclared work increases the probability 
of working undeclared by 32.1 percentage points while perceiving the risk of detection as 
being fairly high or very high rather than fairly small or small reduces the likelihood of 
engaging in undeclared work only by 7.2 percentage points. In 2013, meanwhile, as opposed 
to the view of the stakeholders, the highest marginal effect is reported for the two variables 
related to the “social actor” approach, refuting the hypotheses H3a, H3b and H4a, H4b. Put 
another way, the relationship between vertical and horizontal trust and the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work has become stronger in 2013 compared with 2007. Figures 
A1 and A2 provide a visual view of the marginal effects in 2007 and 2013. This display that 
the effect of horizontal trust in form of social norms is far larger than the effect of the other 
variables in both years, and that the effectiveness of the horizontal and vertical trust is higher 
in 2013, placing these measures as the two most effective ones.  
In sum, this fixed-effect logistic regression analysis reveals a significant association 
between the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work and not only the “rational economic 
actor” but also the “social actor” approach. Meanwhile, comparing the two waves of the 
Special Eurobarometer survey on undeclared work, it is revealed that, in 2013 compared with 
2007, the deterrents are less effective than the vertical and horizontal trust. These results 
support the need to complement the conventional rational approach, which is heavily used by 
governments, with the social actor approach which recognises the role of improving vertical 
and horizontal trust in tackling the undeclared economy.  
Discussion and Conclusions  
Since the turn of the millennium, both academic scholarship and supra-national institutions 
have recognised the need for governments to transform undeclared work into declared work 
rather than simply repress it and thus, for a deterrence policy approach to be complemented 
by a social actor approach. From the perspective of the European Commission, this was first 
recognised at the Lisbon Summit of the European Council. As Employment Policy Guideline 




Member states should develop and implement broad actions and measures … 
which combine simplification of the business environment, removing 
disincentives and providing appropriate incentives in the tax and benefits 
system, improved law enforcement and the application of sanctions (European 
Commission 2003, 9). 
 
Following this, and in its second communication on undeclared work, the European 
Commission (2007) again explicitly called for member states to transform undeclared work 
into declared work by using alongside deterrence measures a range of new innovative policy 
measures, including awareness raising campaigns to improve tax morale. This was further 
reinforced in 2016 when the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work was created 
following European Parliament legislation. In article 1 of Decision (EU) 2016/3441 
establishing the Platform, it is stated that “‘tackling’, in relation to undeclared work, means 
preventing, deterring and combating undeclared work as well as promoting the declaration of 
undeclared work” (Williams and Puts 2017). Thus, and as the first policy paper produced by 
the Platform recognise, there is a need for a holistic approach which uses both the rational 
economic actor and social actor policy approaches (Williams 2017).   
On the other hand, academic scholarship has also questioned the effectiveness of 
deterrents in tackling undeclared work, as discussed in the review of the literature. The 
current paper contributes to this body of work. It reveals that at the EU-27 level, while both 
types of policy approach are significantly associated with reducing the likelihood of engaging 
in undeclared work, the strength of the impact differs. The impact is stronger for the “social 
actor” approach which examines the influence of improving both vertical (tax morale) and 
horizontal trust (knowing other people that engage in undeclared work) on the likelihood 
participation in undeclared work. Furthermore, the strength of the impact of deterrents on the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work has weakened between 2007 and 2013, but has 
strengthened for vertical and horizontal trust. This provides support for the calls made by the 
European Commission to national governments to complement deterrence measures with 
other policy measures focused on improving vertical and horizontal trust.  
However, despite this strengthening of the relationship between the likelihood of 
participation in undeclared work and the level of vertical and horizontal trust, and weakening 
of the relationship between participation and deterrents, national governments have continued 
to heavily rely on the use of deterrence measures and the view that deterrents are the most 
effective approach has even increased over time (Williams and Puts 2017). This sits in stark 
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contrast to the evidence presented in this paper that the likelihood of participation in 
undeclared work has become less affected by the perceived level of deterrents, and more 
influenced by perceptions of the level of vertical and horizontal trust.   
As the subject investigated is related to a sensitive topic, limitations exist due to this 
fact (Feld and Larsen 2012). The face-to-face interviews assured the respondents that the 
collected information would be handled in strict confidentiality and anonymity and adopted a 
gradual approach towards the more sensitive issues. As such, the attitudinal questions about 
undeclared work, were followed by questions on whether respondents purchased undeclared 
goods and/or services, received envelope wages and only then, questions related with 
engagement in undeclared work in the 12 months prior to the survey. Nevertheless, the survey 
may not capture the total amount of undeclared work and potential biases could appear due to 
respondent`s honesty when answering questions related to illegitimate issues. As for example, 
in these two waves of the Eurobarometer survey, a larger share of persons from Nordic 
countries reported engagement in undeclared work compared with other European regions. 
Although in 91% of the interviews, the interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation 
from the participant, and average cooperation in 8% of cases, the level of excellent and good 
cooperation was found to be higher in Nordic nations (96% of cases) and lowest in Southern 
Europe (87% of cases). This intimates that the sincerity of respondents when answering the 
survey might have been lower in Southern Europe. This might explain firstly why the 
participation was reported higher in Nordic countries despite the fact that previous research 
showed a higher tax morale in Nordic countries compared with Southern Europe (Alm and 
Torgler 2006) and secondly why there is a lack of correlation between the share of reported 
undeclared work and the macro level estimates of the shadow economy (listed in Table 2). 
Another limitation of this study is that it covers only EU countries. One should 
therefore be cautious when extrapolating the results for other countries and contexts. For 
instance, the perception of risk of being caught vary from country to country and from culture 
to culture. Whether the results are valid for other countries and contexts other than those 
directly analyzed now needs to be evaluated. 
In the Eurobarometer series, the topic of undeclared work was investigated only in 
2007 and 2013. To trace the transformations over time, similar items were administrated. 
However, not all items administrated in 2007 are found in the survey conducted in 2013 (e.g., 
gross income per month from formal employment), making them unusable in this analysis. 
Moreover, considering that the respondents are different in each wave, Eurobarometer surveys 
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do not meet the prerequisites of a true panel. Thus, the paper uses cross-sectional data and the 
comparison between 2007 and 2013 waves should be cautiously interpreted. 
Lastly, due to the data set limitations, this study uses two proxies for investigating the 
relationship between the vertical and horizontal trust and undeclared work. Future studies 
could investigate this relationship further by measuring the trust in formal institutions directly 
and various forms of horizontal trust beyond the one used in this study (i.e., generalized trust). 
In sum, this paper has for the first time revealed that the association between the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work and the perceived level of deterrents has 
weakened over time, while the association with the perceived level of horizontal and vertical 
trust has strengthened. However, national governments still seek to eradicate undeclared work 
using deterrents, and their view that this is the most effective method has increased over time. 
There is thus a need for not only academic scholarship but also the European Commission to 
be more active in drawing to the attention of national governments the growing gap between 
their perceptions of what is effective, and what is in lived practice effective, in tackling 
undeclared work. If this paper helps to bridge that gap, then its main intention will have been 
achieved. The danger of course, as this paper has shown, is that unless an evidence-based 
approach to policy-making is pursued, the gap between what is used to tackle the problem, 
and what is most effective, will continue to diverge.   
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Figure 1. Supply of undeclared work: expected sanctions, detection risk, tax morale and 
knowing persons engaged in undeclared work, 2007 





Figure 2. Supply of undeclared work: expected sanctions, detection risk, tax morale and 
knowing persons engaged in undeclared work, 2013 




Table 1. Evaluations of the “rational economic actor” approach: evidence from previous studies 
Study Region 
Method/ Source of 
data 
Sample Findings 
Supportive of the rational economic actor approach 
Dubin and Wilde,  
1988 
US 
Secondary data from 
Internal Revenue 
Service and Annual 
Report of the 
Commissioner of 
Internal revenue 
5,580 observations Significant effect of deterrents (audits) on tax noncompliance.  
Feld and Frey, 2002 Switzerland  Survey 
tax authorities of the 26 
Swiss cantons 
Increased fines reduce tax evasion. 
Friedland, 1982 NA Experimental design 
16 participants (law 
students) 
Both the risk of detection and fines reduce tax noncompliance with the risk of 




Israel Experimental design 
15 participants 
(psychology students) 
Penalties represents more effective deterrents than the risk of detection in reducing 
the tax noncompliance. 
Klepper and Nagin, 
1989 
US Experimental design 489 observations  Both, risk of detection and sanction reduce the tax noncompliance. 
Kluge and Libman, 
2017 
Russia 
Secondary data on 
taxi market (taxi 
licences) 
76 regions For the formal market, the higher the sanctions the smaller the shadow economy. 








Increasing power of detection and penalty might be able to enhance tax 
compliance. 
Mazzolini, Pagani 
and Santoro, 2017 










observed for the 2007-
2011 period) 






Experimental design  
1,724 observations 
(taxpayers) 









The increased probability of detection (audit), information reporting and tax 
withholding increase the tax compliance. 
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Partially supportive of the rational economic actor approach (calling for inclusion of complementary approaches) 
Alm, Sanchez and 




11 sessions of 9 to 10 
participants 
Detection and punishment needs to be complemented by positive rewards for 
obtaining greater tax compliance. 
Bernasconi, 1998 - Hypothetical model - 
The standard expected utility model cannot explain the rate of tax compliance, 
unless individuals’ aversion to risk is far higher than the conventional hypothesis. 
Grasmick and 
Bursik, 1990 
US city Survey 
1,985 face to face 
interviews 
Includes the significant others (socially imposed costs) and conscience (self-
imposed costs) along with legal sanctions for measuring the deterrents and reveals 
that for tax cheating the highest direct effect is represented by shame (affecting 
conscience) and not the legal sanctions. 
Kaplanoglou and 
Rapanos, 2015 
Greece Experimental design 
320 participants 
(students) 
In high trust conditions, power of tax authorities is perceived as legitimate whilst 
in low trust environments the power of authorities is perceived coercive and has a 










1, 319 participants 
(students) 
Participants in the group of low trust and low power display the lowest intention to 
comply and the highest intention to evade taxes. 
Schwartz and 
Orleans, 1967 
US Experimental design 273 participants 
Both sanctions and appeals to conscience are effective for reducing tax non-




UK Experimental design 
76 participants 
(students) 
The increased probability of detection (audit) increase the tax compliance while 
the severity of penalties has no significant impact. 






Deterrence measures have little impact on reducing the probability of participation 
in undeclared work when tax morale is high. Only when tax morale is low that 
raising the level of deterrents has greater impacts, with increasing the perceived 
risks of detection in such contexts leading to higher reductions in participation in 










Deterrence measures reduce participation in undeclared work only when tax 
morale is low and have little impact when tax morale is high. 
Not supportive of the rational economic actor approach 
Chang and Lai, 
2004 
- Theoretical model  - 
Increasing fines results rather in increasing the tax noncompliance. Also, the social 
norms have decisive role on determining the tax compliance.  
Farrar, Kaplan and  
Thorne, 2017 
US Experimental design 204 participants 
Tax compliance intentions are highest when quality of the treatment provided to 
individuals from authority figures (interactional fairness) is higher and detection 
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Austria Experimental design 
726 participants 
(students) 
The amount of fines does not influence the taxpayers behavior, while participants’ 





- Experimental design 
120 participants 
(students) 
Strict audits and severe fines might alienate individuals and reduce the cooperative 





710 small and medium-
size enterprises 
The trust in tax authorities and individual morality foster voluntary compliance 
and taxpaying behavior. Coercive power of tax authorities has a negative effect on 
both intended tax compliance and voluntary tax compliance and positive effect on 
enforced tax compliance. 





Punishment not only have an insignificant impact on compliant taxpayers but also 
represents a trigger for a less compliant behaviour. 
Murphy, 2005 Australia 
Longitudinal survey 
data 
2,292 participants in the 
first study and 659 in 
the follow up study 
Coercive measures and threaten undermine the legitimacy of the tax authority and 
consequently reduce compliance behaviour. 
Murphy and Harris, 
2007; Murphy, 2008 
Australia Survey 
652 participants (tax 
offenders) 
Punitive measures are rather counterproductive in reducing the tax non-
compliance. Feelings experienced during an enforcement event (i.e. reintegration, 
stigmatization) are related to repeating the offending behaviour. 
Shaw, Slemrod and 
Whiting, 2008 
UK 








- Theoretical model  - 
A high expected penalty for tax evasion determine the voters to choose a low 







No association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level 
of penalties and risk of detection, but a strong association between participation in 







No association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level 
of penalties and risk of detection, but a strong association between participation in 
undeclared work and the level of tax morale. 
Note: * protecting revenues, protecting tax revenues, anti-avoidance measures. 
Source: authors own work. 
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Table 2. Size of Shadow Economy/ Undeclared Work (UDW), by country (2007-2015) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  2013  2014 2015 
 a) a) a) a) a) a)  a) b1) b2) b3)  a) a) 
Austria 7.69  7.78  9.65  9.07  8.47  8.40   8.68  8.7 6.0 10  8.39  9.01  
Belgium 18.27  18.28  18.74  18.8  17.71  18.28   18.81  11.9 7.2 15.4  18.06  17.8  
Bulgaria 23.70  22.77  24.08  23.42  22.39  22.12   22.37  17.8 13.2 19.2  21.60  20.83  
Cyprus 29.03  28.77  31.64  31.39  32.71  33.32   34.66  13.8 8.4 17.9  32.69  32.20  
Czech Rep 11.53  11.18  13.52  12.97  11.68  11.5   11.79  7.7 5.5 16.9  10.76  10.47  
Denmark 12.51  13.01  16.33  16.17  15.26  15.48   15.24  9.6 5.5 14.3  14.13  14.70  
Estonia 17.84  19.42  24.60  22.99  19.67  18.34   17.97  14.8 10.4 21.3  17.52  18.49  
Finland 10.98  10.95  13.11  12.54  12.19  12.59   13.08  9.3 5.8 11.8  12.12  13.30  
France 12.88  11.61  13.89  13.11  11.81  12.08   12.41  8.8 5.3 11  12.12  11.65  
Germany 10.56  9.59  11.69  10.88  9.05  8.85   9.22  4.4 2.9 7.1  8.17  7.75  
Greece 24.23  23.2  25.32  26.15  27.08  28.39   27.78  12.5 7.2 22.5  27.11  26.45  
Hungary 21.40  20.58  23.18  22.82  21.87  22.26   21.63  17.3 11.3 23.2  20.78  20.49  
Ireland 12.55  12.45  13.36  11.78  12.49  11.4   11.14  8.6 5.4 13  9.93  9.58  
Italy 22.43  23.51  27.31  26.13  24.54  25.53   24.49  12.9 9.1 17.2  24.33  22.97  
Latvia 17.04  18.27  21.16  20.41  18.67  17.32   16.68  18.3 12.3 22.3  15.92  16.62  
Lithuania 20.58  20.28  24.29  23.13  20.86  19.32   18.30  19.8 13.6 25.2  17.62  18.65  
Luxembourg 9.37  9.65  11.01  10.37  10.34  10.80   10.65  5.4 3.2 9.1  10.39  10.38  
Malta 26.96  27.30  30.55  29.19  28.06  27.25   27.15  n.a. n.a. n.a.  28.08  29.43  
Netherlands 10.55  9.58  8.9  8.6  8.09  8.11   8.44  5.2 3.0 11.9  8.75  7.83  
Poland 23.51  21.65  21.56  20.93  19.33  19.04   18.86  20.8 14.6 27.3  18.09  16.67  
Portugal 22.05  20.74  21.67  20.79  20.37  20.24   20.38  6.6 4.1 15.5  19.29  17.82  
Romania 27.03  25.44  28.23  26.76  25.41  25.14   23.97  18.9 14.5 26.2  22.73  22.94  
Slovakia 12.15  11.52  13.47  12.84  11.96  11.81   11.75  13.2 9.6 16.4  11.64  11.18  
Slovenia 17.96  17.58  22.24  22.54  22.18  22.89   23.02  13.4 9.1 14.7  21.49  20.21  
Spain 22.67  21.53  24.24  23.91  23.65  24.08   24.35  8.8 6.0 17.9  24.04  22.01  
Sweden 10.12  10.3  12.71  11.45  11.08  11.89   12.31  7.8 3.2 9.7  11.88  11.74  
UK 10.78  9.83  11  10.33  10.06  9.91   9.57  2.7 1.7 9.6  8.81  8.32  
Notes: 
a) – MIMIC, % of GDP (Medina and Schneider, 2018) 
b) – Labour Input Method (LIM) (Williams et al., 2017): b1) % of total labour input in the private sector; b2) 
minimum % of total labour input in the economy; b3) % of GVA in the private sector 
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Table 3. Fixed-effects logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work (crude data) 
  Model 1 – Both waves  Model 2 – Both waves  Model 3 – 2007 wave  Model 4 – 2013 wave 
Variables    se() Exp() Marg.    se() Exp() Marg.    se() Exp() Marg.    se() Exp() Marg. 
Gender (Female)                         
Male  0.641 *** 0.051 1.898 0.135  0.635 *** 0.051 1.888 0.130  0.702 *** 0.068 2.018 0.124  0.557 *** 0.079 1.745 0.130 
Age  0.030 *** 0.010 1.031 -0.008  0.029 *** 0.010 1.030 -0.008  0.039 *** 0.013 1.039 -0.007  0.017  0.015 1.018 -0.009 
Age squared  -0.001 *** 0.000 0.999   -0.001 *** 0.000 0.999   -0.001 *** 0.000 0.999   -0.001 *** 0.000 0.999  
Occupation (Not working)                       
Self-employed  0.103  0.091 1.108 0.020  0.106  0.091 1.111 0.020  0.104  0.123 1.110 0.016  0.122  0.137 1.130 0.027 
Employed  -0.490 *** 0.061 0.613 -0.106  -0.482 *** 0.061 0.617 -0.102  -0.491 *** 0.082 0.612 -0.091  -0.478 *** 0.094 0.620 -0.113 
Household size (one person)                       
Two  -0.355 *** 0.064 0.701 -0.074  -0.354 *** 0.064 0.702 -0.072  -0.276 *** 0.087 0.759 -0.049  -0.459 *** 0.097 0.632 -0.105 
Three and more  -0.266 *** 0.071 0.767 -0.054  -0.262 *** 0.071 0.770 -0.052  -0.186 * 0.095 0.831 -0.032  -0.363 *** 0.109 0.696 -0.082 
Community type (Rural or village)                      
Small/middle town  -0.043  0.059 0.958 -0.009  -0.048  0.059 0.953 -0.010  -0.041  0.078 0.960 -0.007  -0.028  0.091 0.973 -0.006 
Large town  -0.059  0.064 0.943 -0.013  -0.061  0.064 0.941 -0.013  -0.054  0.085 0.947 -0.010  -0.057  0.100 0.945 -0.013 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)                  
Tax/ social security  -0.266 *** 0.055 0.767 -0.055  -0.255 *** 0.055 0.775 -0.052  -0.289 *** 0.076 0.749 -0.050  -0.245 *** 0.083 0.782 -0.057 
contributions + fine, prison                       
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)                     
Fairly high/Very high  -0.339 *** 0.060 0.713 -0.074  -0.346 *** 0.060 0.707 -0.074  -0.387 *** 0.083 0.679 -0.072  -0.276 *** 0.087 0.759 -0.066 
Tax morality index  0.325 *** 0.014 1.384 0.070  0.326 *** 0.014 1.386 0.068  0.307 *** 0.018 1.360 0.056  0.355 *** 0.022 1.426 0.084 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)                   
Yes  1.916 *** 0.070 6.791 0.371  1.928 *** 0.070 6.877 0.364  1.850 *** 0.097 6.359 0.321  1.978 *** 0.101 7.229 0.410 
Year dummy 2013  -0.136 *** 0.051 0.873 -0.029                   
Observations  38,413  38,413  19,245  19,168 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27 
Pseudo R-squared  0.210  0.210  0.199  0.221 
AIC  11984.84  11990.09  6723.65  5110.50 
BIC  12104.62  12101.32  6825.89  5212.69 
LR chi2  3183.64  3176.39  1662.16  1446.61 
Prob. > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 








Figure A1. Marginal effects (2007) 
Note: UDW - undeclared work. 







Figure A2. Marginal effects (2013) 
Note: UDW - undeclared work. 




Table A1. Fixed-effects logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work (crude data, additive models) 
  Model 1 – Both waves   Model 2 – Both waves 
Variables  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 1c   Model 2a  Model 2b  Model 2c 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)               
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, prison 
 -0.219*** (0.054)  -0.268*** (0.055)  -0.266*** (0.055)   -0.208*** (0.054)  -0.257*** (0.055)  -0.255*** (0.055) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)                  
Fairly high/Very high  -0.307*** (0.059)  -0.333*** (0.060)  -0.339*** (0.060)   -0.315*** (0.059)  -0.341*** (0.060)  -0.346*** (0.060) 
Tax morality index  0.366*** (0.013)  0.325*** (0.014)  0.325*** (0.014)   0.367*** (0.013)  0.327*** (0.014)  0.326*** (0.014) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)              
Yes  2.048*** (0.069)  1.915*** (0.070)  1.916*** (0.070)   2.060*** (0.069)  1.928*** (0.070)  1.928*** (0.070) 
Year dummy   Yes   Yes   Yes    No   No   No 
Gender (Female)                    
Male     0.643*** (0.051)  0.641*** (0.051)      0.637*** (0.051)  0.635*** (0.051) 
Age     0.031*** (0.010)  0.030*** (0.010)      0.030*** (0.010)  0.029*** (0.010) 
Age squared     -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)      -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)                    
Self-employed     0.101 (0.091)  0.103 (0.091)      0.104 (0.091)  0.106 (0.091) 
Employed     -0.490*** (0.061)  -0.490*** (0.061)      -0.482*** (0.061)  -0.482*** (0.061) 
Household size (one person)                    
Two     -0.347*** (0.064)  -0.355*** (0.064)      -0.346*** (0.064)  -0.354*** (0.064) 
Three and more     -0.256*** (0.070)  -0.266*** (0.071)      -0.252*** (0.070)  -0.262*** (0.071) 
Community type (Rural or village)                  
Small/middle town        -0.043 (0.059)         -0.048 (0.059) 
Large town        -0.059 (0.064)         -0.061 (0.064) 
Observations  38,473  38,473  38,413   38,473  38,473  38,413 
Number of countries  27  27  27   27  27  27 
LR chi2  2551.12  3183.43  3183.64   2544.03  3175.92  3176.39 
Prob. > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  




Table A1. Fixed-effects logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work (crude data, additive models) - continued 
  Model 3 – 2007 wave   Model 4 – 2013 wave 
Variables  Model 3a  Model 3b  Model 3c   Model 4a  Model 4b  Model 4c 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)               
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, prison 
 -0.244*** (0.074)  -0.292*** (0.076)  -0.289*** (0.076)   -0.204** (0.081)  -0.247*** (0.083)  -0.245*** (0.083) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)                  
Fairly high/Very high  -0.332*** (0.081)  -0.378*** (0.083)  -0.387*** (0.083)   -0.263*** (0.086)  -0.274*** (0.087)  -0.276*** (0.087) 
Tax morality index  0.348*** (0.017)  0.308*** (0.018)  0.307*** (0.018)   0.391*** (0.021)  0.355*** (0.022)  0.355*** (0.022) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)               
Yes  1.993*** (0.096)  1.848*** (0.097)  1.850*** (0.097)   2.097*** (0.100)  1.979*** (0.101)  1.978*** (0.101) 
Year dummy   No   No   No    No   No   No 
Gender (Female)                    
Male     0.707*** (0.068)  0.702*** (0.068)      0.555*** (0.079)  0.557*** (0.079) 
Age     0.040*** (0.013)  0.039*** (0.013)      0.018 (0.015)  0.017 (0.015) 
Age squared     -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)      -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)                    
Self-employed     0.100 (0.122)  0.104 (0.123)      0.124 (0.137)  0.122 (0.137) 
Employed     -0.491*** (0.082)  -0.491*** (0.082)      -0.478*** (0.094)  -0.478*** (0.094) 
Household size (one person)                    
Two     -0.266*** (0.086)  -0.276*** (0.087)      -0.453*** (0.097)  -0.459*** (0.097) 
Three and more     -0.176* (0.094)  -0.186* (0.095)      -0.354*** (0.107)  -0.363*** (0.109) 
Community type (Rural or village)                  
Small/middle town        -0.041 (0.078)         -0.028 (0.091) 
Large town        -0.054 (0.085)         -0.057 (0.100) 
Observations  19,294  19,294  19,245   19,179  19,179  19,168 
Number of country  27  27  27   27  27  27 
LR chi2  1298.94  1662.46  1662.16   1176.97  1446.21  1446.61 
Prob. > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: own calculations based on the Special Eurobarometer 284/ Wave 67.3 and Special Eurobarometer 402/ Wave 79.2. 
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Table A2. Fixed-effects logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work 
(crude data, detection risk and tax morality recoded) 
Variables 
 Model 1 
Both waves 
 Model 2 
Both waves 
 Model 3 
2007 wave 
 Model 4 
2013 wave 
Gender (Female)             
Male  0.631*** (0.052)  0.626*** (0.052)  0.696*** (0.068)  0.548*** (0.079) 
Age  0.030*** (0.010)  0.029*** (0.010)  0.039*** (0.013)  0.016 (0.015) 
Age squared  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)           
Self-employed  0.104 (0.091)  0.107 (0.091)  0.101 (0.123)  0.136 (0.138) 
Employed  -0.488*** (0.061)  -0.481*** (0.061)  -0.492*** (0.082)  -0.469*** (0.094) 
Household size (one person)           
Two  -0.354*** (0.064)  -0.353*** (0.064)  -0.275*** (0.087)  -0.456*** (0.097) 
Three and more  -0.263*** (0.071)  -0.259*** (0.071)  -0.184* (0.095)  -0.362*** (0.109) 
Community type (Rural or village)           
Small/middle town  -0.042 (0.059)  -0.047 (0.059)  -0.040 (0.078)  -0.030 (0.091) 
Large town  -0.058 (0.064)  -0.060 (0.064)  -0.052 (0.085)  -0.068 (0.100) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)       
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.261*** (0.055)  -0.250*** (0.055)  -0.286*** (0.076)  -0.241*** (0.083) 
Detection risk (Very high)           
Fairly high  -0.007 (0.133)  -0.012 (0.133)  0.120 (0.190)  -0.156 (0.188) 
Fairly small  0.266** (0.127)  0.268** (0.127)  0.456** (0.180)  0.035 (0.181) 
Very small  0.485*** (0.132)  0.494*** (0.132)  0.553*** (0.187)  0.409** (0.189) 
Tax morality index  0.324*** (0.014)  0.325*** (0.014)  0.307*** (0.018)  0.353*** (0.022) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)        
Yes  1.907*** (0.070)  1.919*** (0.070)  1.845*** (0.097)  1.967*** (0.101) 
Year dummy   Yes   No   No   No 
Observations  38,413  38,413  19,245  19,168 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27 
LR chi2  3196.46  3190.07  1664.12  1461.63 
Prob. > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  





Table A2. Fixed-effects logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work 
(crude data, detection risk and tax morality recoded) – continued 
Variables 
 Model 1 
Both waves 
 Model 2 
Both waves 
 Model 3 
2007 wave 
 Model 4 
2013 wave 
Gender (Female)             
Male  0.653*** (0.051)  0.647*** (0.051)  0.711*** (0.068)  0.574*** (0.078) 
Age  0.032*** (0.010)  0.031*** (0.010)  0.039*** (0.013)  0.022 (0.015) 
Age squared  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)           
Self-employed  0.101 (0.090)  0.103 (0.090)  0.125 (0.122)  0.095 (0.136) 
Employed  -0.495*** (0.061)  -0.487*** (0.061)  -0.483*** (0.081)  -0.501*** (0.093) 
Household size (one person)           
Two  -0.360*** (0.064)  -0.360*** (0.064)  -0.278*** (0.086)  -0.460*** (0.096) 
Three and more  -0.292*** (0.071)  -0.289*** (0.071)  -0.199** (0.094)  -0.394*** (0.107) 
Community type (Rural or village)           
Small/middle town  -0.050 (0.058)  -0.055 (0.058)  -0.053 (0.077)  -0.023 (0.090) 
Large town  -0.079 (0.064)  -0.081 (0.064)  -0.065 (0.084)  -0.095 (0.099) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)       
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.294*** (0.055)  -0.282*** (0.055)  -0.313*** (0.075)  -0.270*** (0.082) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)          
Fairly high/Very high -0.334*** (0.059)  -0.343*** (0.059)  -0.384*** (0.083)  -0.264*** (0.086) 
Tax morality (Below average)           
Above average  1.115*** (0.056)  1.117*** (0.056)       
Tax morality (Below 2007 average)           
Above 2007 average        1.108*** (0.073)    
Tax morality (Below 2013 average)           
Above 2013 average           1.169*** (0.090) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)        
Yes  1.929*** (0.070)  1.944*** (0.070)  1.852*** (0.097)  1.996*** (0.101) 
Year dummy   Yes   No   No   No 
Observations  38,413  38,413  19,245  19,168 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27 
LR chi2  3069.32  3059.77  1618.00  1376.25 
Prob. > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  





Table A3. Fixed-effects logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work 
(imputed missing data) 
Variables 











Gender (Female)             
Male  0.616*** (0.046)  0.614*** (0.046)  0.715*** (0.063)  0.495*** (0.067) 
Age  0.039*** (0.009)  0.038*** (0.009)  0.042*** (0.012)  0.033*** (0.013) 
Age squared  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)           
Self-employed  0.042 (0.082)  0.042 (0.082)  0.079 (0.112)  0.019 (0.118) 
Employed  -0.448*** (0.054)  -0.446*** (0.054)  -0.436*** (0.075)  -0.447*** (0.079) 
Household size (one person)           
Two  -0.343*** (0.057)  -0.342*** (0.057)  -0.305*** (0.079)  -0.396*** (0.084) 
Three and more  -0.257*** (0.063)  -0.255*** (0.063)  -0.202** (0.086)  -0.313*** (0.093) 
Community type (Rural or village)           
Small/middle town  -0.019 (0.053)  -0.021 (0.053)  -0.041 (0.072)  0.021 (0.078) 
Large town  -0.042 (0.056)  -0.042 (0.056)  -0.034 (0.077)  -0.047 (0.084) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)       
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.177*** (0.052)  -0.174*** (0.051)  -0.254*** (0.073)  -0.113 (0.074) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)          
Fairly high/Very high -0.364*** (0.055)  -0.366*** (0.055)  -0.404*** (0.077)  -0.305*** (0.076) 
Tax morality index  0.320*** (0.012)  0.320*** (0.012)  0.304*** (0.016)  0.341*** (0.018) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)        
Yes  1.993*** (0.061)  1.997*** (0.061)  1.929*** (0.090)  2.052*** (0.087) 
Year dummy   Yes   No   No   No 
Observations  53,222  53,222  26,659  26,563 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27 
Imputations  20  20  20  20 
F  197.44  212.07  107.53  103.13 
Prob. > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  




















Gender (Female)             
Male  0.642*** (0.052)  0.636*** (0.051)  0.704*** (0.068)  0.559*** (0.079) 
Age  0.030*** (0.010)  0.029*** (0.010)  0.039*** (0.013)  0.017 (0.015) 
Age squared  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)           
Self-employed  0.103 (0.091)  0.106 (0.091)  0.105 (0.123)  0.123 (0.138) 
Employed  -0.490*** (0.061)  -0.483*** (0.061)  -0.493*** (0.082)  -0.479*** (0.094) 
Household size (one person)           
Two  -0.355*** (0.064)  -0.354*** (0.064)  -0.276*** (0.087)  -0.460*** (0.097) 
Three and more  -0.266*** (0.071)  -0.262*** (0.071)  -0.186** (0.095)  -0.364*** (0.109) 
Community type (Rural or village)           
Small/middle town  -0.043 (0.059)  -0.048 (0.059)  -0.041 (0.078)  -0.027 (0.091) 
Large town  -0.059 (0.064)  -0.061 (0.064)  -0.054 (0.085)  -0.057 (0.100) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)       
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.266*** (0.055)  -0.255*** (0.055)  -0.290*** (0.076)  -0.246*** (0.083) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)          
Fairly high/Very high -0.339*** (0.060)  -0.347*** (0.060)  -0.388*** (0.083)  -0.277*** (0.087) 
Tax morality index  0.325*** (0.014)  0.327*** (0.014)  0.308*** (0.018)  0.356*** (0.022) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)        
Yes  1.918*** (0.070)  1.930*** (0.070)  1.853*** (0.097)  1.983*** (0.101) 
Year dummy   Yes   No   No   No 
Country dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Constant  -4.256*** (0.240)  -4.319*** (0.239)  -4.361*** (0.317)  -4.238*** (0.368) 
Observations  38,413  38,413  19,245  19,168 
Pseudo R2  0.2451  0.2447  0.2390  0.2552 
LR chi2  3932.64  3925.38  2146.66  1786.50 
Prob. > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  




















Gender (Female)             
Male  0.617*** (0.046)  0.615*** (0.046)  0.716*** (0.063)  0.496*** (0.067) 
Age  0.039*** (0.009)  0.038*** (0.009)  0.042*** (0.012)  0.033*** (0.013) 
Age squared  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000)  -0.001*** (0.000) 
Occupation (Not working)           
Self-employed  0.042 (0.082)  0.042 (0.082)  0.079 (0.112)  0.019 (0.118) 
Employed  -0.449*** (0.054)  -0.446*** (0.054)  -0.437*** (0.075)  -0.448*** (0.079) 
Household size (one person)           
Two  -0.343*** (0.057)  -0.343*** (0.057)  -0.306*** (0.079)  -0.397*** (0.084) 
Three and more  -0.257*** (0.063)  -0.255*** (0.063)  -0.202** (0.086)  -0.314*** (0.093) 
Community type (Rural or village)           
Small/middle town  -0.019 (0.053)  -0.021 (0.053)  -0.041 (0.072)  0.021 (0.078) 
Large town  -0.042 (0.056)  -0.042 (0.056)  -0.034 (0.077)  -0.047 (0.084) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)       
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.177*** (0.052)  -0.174*** (0.052)  -0.255*** (0.073)  -0.113 (0.075) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)          
Fairly high/Very high -0.364*** (0.055)  -0.366*** (0.055)  -0.404*** (0.077)  -0.306*** (0.077) 
Tax morality index  0.320*** (0.012)  0.320*** (0.012)  0.305*** (0.016)  0.342*** (0.018) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)        
Yes  1.995*** (0.061)  1.998*** (0.061)  1.931*** (0.090)  2.056*** (0.087) 
Year dummy   Yes   No   No   No 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -4.692*** (0.216)  -4.711*** (0.215)  -4.652*** (0.292)  -4.751*** (0.319) 
Observations  53,222  53,222  26,659  26,563 
Imputations  20  20  20  20 
F  82.31  84.35  44.40  40.54 
Prob. > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  





Table A6. Multilevel logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work 
(crude data) 
Variables 
 Model 1  
Both waves 
 Model 2  
Both waves 
 Model 3  
2007 wave 
 Model 4  
2013 wave 
Gender (Female)                 
Male  0.640 *** (0.051)  0.635 *** (0.051)  0.700 *** (0.068)  0.559 *** (0.079) 
Age  0.030 *** (0.010)  0.029 *** (0.010)  0.038 *** (0.013)  0.016  (0.015) 
Age squared  -0.001 *** (0.001)  -0.001 *** (0.001)  -0.001 *** (0.001)  -0.001 *** (0.001) 
Occupation (Not working)               
Self-employed  0.105  (0.091)  0.107  (0.091)  0.110  (0.122)  0.122  (0.137) 
Employed  -0.486 *** (0.061)  -0.479 *** (0.061)  -0.485 *** (0.082)  -0.473 *** (0.093) 
Household size (one person)               
Two  -0.358 *** (0.064)  -0.357 *** (0.064)  -0.280 *** (0.087)  -0.462 *** (0.097) 
Three and more  -0.274 *** (0.071)  -0.270 *** (0.071)  -0.199 ** (0.095)  -0.373 *** (0.108) 
Community type (Rural or village)              
Small/middle town  -0.048  (0.059)  -0.053  (0.059)  -0.049  (0.078)  -0.041  (0.091) 
Large town  -0.062  (0.064)  -0.064  (0.064)  -0.055  (0.084)  -0.067  (0.100) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)         
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.264 *** (0.055)  -0.253 *** (0.055)  -0.285 *** (0.076)  -0.239 *** (0.083) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)             
Fairly high/Very high -0.339 *** (0.060)  -0.347 *** (0.060)  -0.384 *** (0.083)  -0.280 *** (0.087) 
Tax morality index  0.326 *** (0.014)  0.327 *** (0.014)  0.309 *** (0.018)  0.354 *** (0.022) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)         
Yes  1.923 *** (0.070)  1.936 *** (0.070)  1.862 *** (0.097)  1.997 *** (0.101) 
Year dummy    Yes    No    No    No 
EU-27 region (East-Central Europe)             
Southern Europe  -0.754 *** (0.213)  -0.753 *** (0.213)  -0.676 *** (0.227)  -0.860 *** (0.272) 
Western Europe  -0.057  (0.182)  -0.056  (0.182)  -0.115  (0.189)  0.023  (0.221) 
Nordic Nations  0.554 ** (0.249)  0.561 ** (0.249)  0.667 *** (0.253)  0.393  (0.306) 
Constant  -4.431 *** (0.249)  -4.496 *** (0.247)  -4.572 *** (0.315)  -4.366 *** (0.359) 
Observations  38,413  38,413  19,245  19,168 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27 
χ2  2274.71  2270.41  1200.94  1058.99 
p>  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Random part                 
Country-level variance 0.1289  0.1280  0.1247  0.1750 
(Standard error) 0.0408  0.0405  0.0437  0.0631 
 Variance at country 
level (%) 3.77  3.74  3.65  5.05 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  





Table A7. Multilevel logistic regression of the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work 
(imputed missing data) 
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: own calculations based on the Special Eurobarometer 284/ Wave 67.3 and Special Eurobarometer 402/ 
Wave 79.2. 
Variables 
 Model 1 
Both waves 
 Model 2 
Both waves 
 Model 3 
2007 wave 
 Model 4 
2013 wave 
Gender (Female)                 
Male  0.616 *** (0.046)  0.614 *** (0.046)  0.713 *** (0.063)  0.497 *** (0.067) 
Age  0.038 *** (0.009)  0.038 *** (0.009)  0.041 *** (0.012)  0.032 ** (0.013) 
Age squared  -0.001 *** (0.001)  -0.001 *** (0.001)  -0.001 *** (0.001)  -0.001 *** (0.001) 
Occupation (Not working)               
Self-employed  0.043  (0.081)  0.043  (0.081)  0.085  (0.112)  0.015  (0.118) 
Employed  -0.446 *** (0.054)  -0.443 *** (0.054)  -0.431 *** (0.075)  -0.445 *** (0.079) 
Household size (one person)               
Two  -0.346 *** (0.057)  -0.345 *** (0.057)  -0.310 *** (0.079)  -0.398 *** (0.084) 
Three and more  -0.264 *** (0.062)  -0.263 *** (0.062)  -0.216 ** (0.086)  -0.322 *** (0.093) 
Community type (Rural or village)             
Small/middle town  -0.024  (0.053)  -0.026  (0.053)  -0.046  (0.072)  0.010  (0.078) 
Large town  -0.044  (0.056)  -0.045  (0.056)  -0.036  (0.076)  -0.053  (0.084) 
Expected sanctions (Tax or social security contributions due)         
Tax/ social security 
contributions + fine, 
prison 
 -0.177 *** (0.052)  -0.175 *** (0.051)  -0.252 *** (0.073)  -0.112  (0.074) 
Detection risk (Very small/Fairly small)             
Fairly high/Very high -0.364 *** (0.055)  -0.366 *** (0.055)  -0.403 *** (0.077)  -0.308 *** (0.076) 
Tax morality index  0.320 *** (0.012)  0.321 *** (0.012)  0.306 *** (0.016)  0.341 *** (0.018) 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work (No)         
Yes  1.999 *** (0.061)  2.003 *** (0.061)  1.939 *** (0.089)  2.065 *** (0.087) 
Year dummy    Yes    No    No    No 
EU-27 region (East-Central Europe)             
Southern Europe  -0.571 *** (0.196)  -0.571 *** (0.196)  -0.591 *** (0.215)  -0.543 ** (0.226) 
Western Europe  -0.059  (0.171)  -0.058  (0.171)  -0.072  (0.180)  -0.032  (0.194) 
Nordic Nations  0.536 ** (0.235)  0.539 ** (0.235)  0.704 *** (0.244)  0.313  (0.271) 
Constant  -4.846 *** (0.223)  -4.866 *** (0.223)  -4.859 *** (0.287)  -4.842 *** (0.309) 
Observations  53,222  53,222  26,659  26,563 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27 
Imputations  20  20  20  20 
Model F test  166.74  176.89  91.12  86.29 
Prob. > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Random part                 
Country-level variance 0.3394  0.3392  0.3435  0.3696 
(Standard error) 0.0527  0.0526  0.0586  0.0630 
    Variance at country 




Table A8. The number of missing values for the variables used in the regression modelling for 
robustness check of the results* 
Variables Complete Incomplete Imputed 
Gender 53,222 0 0 
Age/ Age squared 53,222 0 0 
Occupation 53,222 0 0 
Household size 53,222 0 0 
Community type 53,114 108 108 
Undeclared work 51,497 1,725 1,725 
Expected sanctions 44,743 8,479 8,479 
Detection risk 47,125 6,097 6,097 
Tax morality index 49,278 3,944 3,944 
Personally know people engaged in undeclared work 50,037 3,185 3,185 
Year dummy 53,222 0 0 
EU-27 region 53,222 0 0 
Notes*: The highest number of missing values is reported for the two questions related with the perceived risk of 
detection and the perceived level of penalties. However, it is important to notice that for the risk of detection, 
5,316 respondents out of 6,097 which have missing values, declared that they do not know which is the risk of 
being caught if working undeclared and only 781 respondents refused to answer. Similarly, 6,120 respondents 
out of the 8,479 respondents with missing values for the variable measuring the expected sanction, declared that 
they do not know what is the expected penalty for someone if caught doing undeclared work. This suggest a low 
tax education of the citizens in the European Union member states. 
Source: own calculations based on the Special Eurobarometer 284/Wave 67.3 and Special Eurobarometer 
402/Wave 79.2 
 
 
 
